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Today it  has been forgotten to what extent entry into the [European Economic]
Community led to a reorientation of the organizational and conceptual structures
of Spanish foreign policy. The Spanish administration in general and the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs in particular adapted so much and so quickly to the particular
requirements  of  Communitarian  coordination  that  the  previous  period  seems
almost prehistoric.
Ángel Viñas, Al servicio de Europa1
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Introduction: democratization, modernization and
Europeanization in post-Franco Spain
1 The words of the diplomat and historian Ángel Viñas that head this article remind us of
the deep and rapid change experienced by the Spanish Foreign Service following the
dictatorship  of  General  Francisco  Franco  (1939-1975)  in  order  to  accommodate  to
Spain’s membership  of  the  European  Communities  as  from  1 January  1986.  As  this
author  states,  entry  into  the  EEC  was  a  strong  incentive  to  modernization  in  the
machinery of Spanish foreign policy. However, the changes introduced did not emerge
from  nowhere:  they  were  preceded  by  ten  years  of  reforms  in  the  structures  and
personnel  of  the  Foreign  Service  under  the  dictatorship  to  being  the  tool  of  a
democratic foreign policy.2
2 The democratization of  the  Foreign Service  was  an aspiration shared by the major
political  forces  and  the  Spanish  government.3 A  democratic  Foreign  Service  was
considered a basic requirement of the new foreign policy of democratic Spain. At the
same time, the inner democratization of Spanish diplomacy was seen as part of a larger
process  of  modernization  and  rapprochement  to  Europe  after  forty  years  of
dictatorship.4 The  links  between these  processes  were  sometimes  only  implicit  and
indirect, but they were often explicitly claimed. For Foreign Minister Marcelino Oreja,
“democratization and Europeanization were complementary phenomena” to the extent
that “the transition could not be terminated until  Spain was fully homologated” by
other European democratic countries, a goal that would be achieved only by joining the
EEC.5 Furthermore, for Oreja himself, Spain could have a democratic foreign policy only
if it had a modernized Foreign Service.6
3 During the transition to democracy, the democratization of foreign policy was a widely
discussed topic in political and academic circles. For the main political forces, it was a
matter  of  leaving  behind  Franco’s  authoritarian  model,  characterized  by  the
incomplete international integration of Spain; arbitrary policy in accordance with the
theory of a “foreign power” that was autonomous and not subject to legal and political
controls;  the concentration of that power in the hands of Franco and his ministers;
poor coordination and planning and personalized decision-making; secret diplomacy
that could compromise security and national sovereignty, as the Spain-US agreements
of  1953  had done;  and the  existence  of  a  largely  closed,  elitist,  endogamic  Foreign
Service in need of thorough modernization. This Foreign Service was monopolized by a
diplomatic elite forged in the dictatorship: they should now offer a new face of Spain
under the monarchy of King Juan Carlos I.7
4 The king’s first goal in foreign affairs was “to incorporate Spain into international life
without the limitations inherited from Franco”, as Roberto Mesa states.8 Other actors
expressed their views on this issue. In his speech before the United Nations General
Assembly  on 27 September  1976,  Oreja  claimed that  “respect  for  human rights  and
individual freedom” would be the “cornerstone” of Spain’s new foreign policy.  In a
speech at  the School of  Diplomacy (26 May 1977),  Oreja highlighted the three main
features  that  a  democratic  foreign  policy  should  have:  first,  be  the  expression  of
internal democratic change; second, be effectively controlled by Parliament; third, be
deployed by a modernized Foreign Service.9 For the Socialist member of Parliament
Luis  Yáñez-Barnuevo,  a  democratic  foreign  policy  should  have  three  features:
universalism;  to  be  a  State  policy  defending the national  community  above private
Democratization and Europeanization of the Spanish Foreign Service on the Way...
Cahiers de la Méditerranée, 90 | 2015
2
interests; and to be overtly conducted through democratic procedures of information,
decision and control.10 Similar thoughts were published shortly after by the Socialist
Party’s expert in foreign policy, Fernando Morán.11
5 In a formal sense, Spain’s foreign policy was democratic since the 1977 elections and
passage  of  the  1978  Constitution  insofar  as  it  was  formulated  and  executed  by
representative  governments  in  a  democratic  system.  The  Constitution  clarified  the
institutional structure of the State and the decision-making process in foreign policy.
In  sharp  contrast  with  the  purely  decorative  Cortes  under  Franco,12 effective
parliamentary  control  by  the  lower  house  of  the  Cortes,  the  Congress  of  Deputies
(Congreso  de  los  Diputados),  and  the  Senate  (Senado)  over  the  government  was
established,  although  over  time  the  trend  of  presidentialization  of  Spanish  foreign
policy undermined the effectiveness of democratic controls.
6 Moreover,  Spanish foreign policy after Franco’s death was full  of gestures aimed at
emphasizing  the  differences  with  the  past,  from  signing  international  treaties  on
human  rights13 to  the  establishment  of  relations  with  communist  governments  in
central and Eastern Europe (1977) and with countries such as Mexico (1977) and Israel
(1986).14
7 In this framework, accession to the EEC was the most important objective in Spanish
foreign  policy,  since  “Europe”  was  seen  as  a  guarantee  for  the  consolidation  of
democracy as well as for the economic modernization of the country. In 1962 Spain
asked the EEC for an association agreement, but because of its undemocratic regime it
had  to  settle  for  a  Preferential  Trade  Agreement,  signed  in  1970.15 This  rejection
showed the limits of “Francoist Europeanism” and reinforced the conviction that only a
democratic Spain could fully participate in “Europe”.16
8 The first Spanish government after Franco convinced the Council of Europe to allow it
to  be  admitted  in  1977,  even  though  Spain  had  not  yet  approved  a  democratic
Constitution.17 On 28 July 1977, it presented its application to join the EEC after the first
meeting of the cabinet formed after the democratic elections of June 1977. From 1977 to
1985 Spain –and Portugal– entered into talks and then held negotiations with the EEC
to become member states. The burden of the relations with Brussels fell mainly on the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), which over the years made partial internal reforms,
postponing major changes until Spain finally belonged to the European Communities.
The prospect of entering into “Europe” therefore induced a number of changes in the
ministry, which partially followed the model of other foreign ministries of European
democratic countries.
 
International expansion and internal democratization
within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
9 After almost forty years of relative isolation under the Franco dictatorship, democratic
Spain from 1975 deployed a renewed and expanded international activity.  Although
Spain had relations with numerous countries, the dictatorship’s requests to join the
European Economic Community and NATO were rejected, and it was excluded from the
Council of Europe. By the end of the Franco regime, Spain did not have, or had broken
off, relations with the countries of Eastern Europe, and its diplomacy created tensions
with its main external supporters (United States, Vatican) and its nearest neighbors
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(France, Morocco). Even though Spain had participated in the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe 1975, Franco –who as head of state had only travelled to
Italy to meet Mussolini and to Portugal to meet Salazar, apart from his meeting with
Hitler in Hendaye (France) in 1940– died in 1975 amid international condemnation.
10 In contrast, foreign policy under Juan Carlos I –who traveled to seventeen countries in
1976-1977– Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez (1976-1981) and Foreign Minister Marcelino
Oreja  (1976-1980)  set  a  target  to  achieve  the  normalization  and  recognition
(homologación) of democracy in Spain, equating the internal political system and the
external activities of the country to the model of European democracies and ending the
relative  isolation.18 This  objective  included  universal  relations,  which  required
expanding  diplomatic  and  consular  representations  abroad.  In  1975  Spain  had
diplomatic relations with 122 countries, with 144 in 1982 and 158 in 1989; the number
of Spanish embassies rose in the same period from eighty-one to ninety-one and then
to  ninety-three,  and the  number  of  general  consulates  increased from sixty-one to
eighty  and  then  to  eighty-seven.  The  number  of  career  diplomats  in  the  Spanish
Foreign Service  increased from 545 to  627 between 1975 and 1986.19 In  addition to
extending  its  international  relations,  Spain  joined  thirty-five  international
organizations between 1975 and 2001. 
11 The needs and tasks multiplied proportionally for the Spanish Foreign Service, both in
bilateral and in multilateral forums. At the same time, the decentralization of the State
brought about the creation of seventeen autonomous regions (Comunidades Autónomas) 
from 1979 to 1983, many of which began deploying their own paradiplomatic activity
abroad  outside  control  of  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs.  This,  together  with  EEC
membership  in  1986,  made  management  of  Spanish  foreign  policy  increasingly
complex.20
12 Early democratic governments were convinced that the tools of diplomacy had to be
renewed, even though to a large extent, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs worked during
1975-1985 with the structures and staff it had inherited from the Franco regime –a state
of affairs that the then diplomat and later Foreign Minister Fernando Morán came to
characterize  as  “handicraft  diplomacy”.21 Although  public  spending  on  diplomacy
increased  in  absolute  terms,  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs’  share  of  the  national
budget declined from 0.68 per cent to 0.52 per cent from 1975 to 1986.22 Nevertheless,
modernization  and  democratization  continued  under  the  apparently  motionless
surface at the Santa Cruz Palace, the ministry’s headquarters.
13 The  years  1975-1985  saw  frequent  reorganizations  of  the  MFA,  whose  basic
organizational structure was altered in 1976, 1979, 1983 and 1984.23 From the point of
view of  internal  coordination,  an  important  breakthrough came in  1979,  when the
figure of secretary of state was created as the second-in-command within the ministry.
It was a figure equivalent to the vice-minister in many European ministries of foreign
affairs, so its creation facilitated communication with them and was also a suggestion
of convergence with the organizational models of other European diplomacies.24
14 Democracy came to the consular service as well. As a country of emigrants, Spain had
at  least  2.5 million  nationals  living  outside  its  borders.  A  significant  number  were
political exiles who had migrated from 1936-1939 onwards, but the bulk of this diaspora
consisted of workers who arrived in Latin America before 1945 and in Western Europe
after that year. Under the dictatorship, the consulates, besides giving these migrants
administrative  and  social  assistance,  had  also  played  a  crucial  role  in  the  political
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surveillance  and  control  of  Spaniards  abroad.25 Many  Spaniards,  especially  those
contrary to Franco, distrusted consular offices for that reason.26
15 Since the arrival of democracy and the simultaneous development of the welfare state,
consulates had to reorient their activities to strengthen the delivery of public services
and to project an image of a civil administration informed by democratic principles.27
In September 1977 the prime minister called for an internal democratization of the
Directorate General of Consular Affairs of the MFA.28 The MFA renewed the personnel
serving  at  the  consulates,  opening  jobs  to  Spaniards  living  abroad  and  their
associations –many of whom were on the left, especially in Europe.29 In the following
years, the Directorate General of Consular Affairs tried out two participation models:
the Consular Boards (Juntas Consulares)  created in 1978, and the Councils of Spanish
Residents (Consejos de Españoles Residentes), created in 1983.30 Along with these bodies,
the  logistical  support  provided  by  consulates  for  the  participation  of  migrants  in
democratic  elections  starting  in  1979  helped  change  the  relationship  of  Spanish
communities abroad with the Foreign Service.31
16 Diplomats had to build a new relationship with citizens and political activities not only
abroad but also at home. This required a new relationship with the mass media. Politics
and  diplomacy  seemed  more  intertwined  now  than  under  Franco.  The  democratic
model of foreign policy also required the end of secrecy, which was the norm under the
dictatorship. Thus, after 1975 information policy became a major concern of diplomats,
32 who needed to properly convey foreign policy to the public, and to a new generation
of journalists, who were often very critical of the government. There was a reciprocal
influence  among  journalists  and  diplomats,  which  resulted  in  stronger  democratic
control  of  public  authorities.33 Accordingly,  the  MFA  strengthened  the  Diplomatic
Information Office (Oficina de Información Diplomática), and the prime minister’s cabinet
(Presidencia del Gobierno) enhanced its information policy on international issues under
the leadership of  diplomats  such as  Alberto  Aza,  José  Joaquín Puig  de  la  Bellacasa,
Máximo Cajal, Antonio Oyarzábal and Inocencio Arias.
 
New faces for a democratic Foreign Service
17 Adaptation to new democratic practices also affected the Foreign Service’s personnel
policy. The transition to democracy involved no break with the Francoist State, but
rather a step-by-step adaptation of its norms and institutions. Many diplomats argue
that the Foreign Service adapted smoothly to democracy thanks to its high degree of
professionalism  and  because  –through  their  experience  abroad–  its  members  were
convinced that the future of Spain was democratic and “European”.34 But according to
the academic and former diplomat Angel Viñas, many of the old “men, attitudes and
deep-rooted patterns of behavior” persisted after 1975. The highest positions in the
ministry and embassies during the transition were in the hands of diplomats who had
made  careers  during  the  dictatorship.  “Some  of  them,  perhaps  a  minority  but  in
positions of responsibility, were sincere Francoists”, states Viñas. Nevertheless, while
“most of them were deeply conservative”, he admits that “they were disciplined and
imbued with a deep sense of service to the State”.35 The vast majority had no problem
transferring  their  allegiance  from  one  regime  to  another,  perhaps  because  they
genuinely  favored  a  Western-style  democratic  system.  For  the  reluctant  ones,  the
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monarchy served as a “bridge institution” that made it easier to transfer their loyalty
from Franco to democracy.36
18 Personnel  policy  proved  to  be  a  critical  instrument  for  the  renewal  of  Spanish
diplomacy. The democratic governments did not purge diplomats and senior officials,
neither  at  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  nor  in  any  other  branch  of  the
administration.37 However, in 1976-1977 the government rehabilitated some diplomats
who had been separated from the diplomatic service under the Franco regime for their
political  activities  in  favor of  democracy,  such as  Vicente Girbau and Julio  Cerón.38
Some of the younger diplomats who began occupying intermediate positions in the
MFA, such as Fernando Morán, Manuel Marín and Carlos Westendorp, were even open
members of the Socialist Party (PSOE, Partido Socialista Obrero Español) or the PSP (Partido
Socialista Popular) founded in 1968 by Enrique Tierno Galván.39
19 At the same time, the new minister of foreign affairs, Marcelino Oreja, promoted the
gradual replacement of diplomats, particularly in top and intermediate positions in the
ministry and in strategic embassies to give a fresh image of the monarchy abroad.40 In
December 1976 the government established a new procedure to provide jobs within the
Foreign Service. Ambassadors were appointed by the Council of Ministers, as before,
but all the lower ranks of the Foreign Service would now be approved by a board (Junta
de  la  Carrera  Diplomática) composed  by  elected  representatives  from  the  different
categories  of  the  diplomatic  service.  The  new  mechanism  would  have  to  be
bureaucratic,  regulated  and  predictable,  putting  an  end  to  the  arbitrariness  of  the
previous  period,  but  most  important,  it  should  also  guarantee,  according  to  Oreja,
democratization within the Foreign Service.41
20 The socialist governments from 1982 onwards undertook a more determined renewal
among diplomatic personnel.42 The new foreign minister, Fernando Morán, entrusted
some key positions to progressive collaborators and to non-diplomatic staff –such as
Ángel Viñas, Francisco José Mayans and Helga Soto43– and renewed the key embassies
with new faces in 1983, as Oreja had done in 1976.44 This caused strong criticism from
conservative diplomats and politicians, who accused Morán of “politicizing” the MFA,45
though in fact seven non-career ambassadors were appointed in 1975-1982 versus nine
in 1982-1989. This suggests that there were enough diplomats the government could
trust politically and that the diplomatic career had become diverse and liberal enough
since the 1960s.  As  Matthieu Trouvé notes,  since  the 1960s  diplomatic  circles  were
considered as progressive within the Franco regime; even though most diplomats acted
as  strict  and  neutral  servants  of  the  State,  there  was  a  minority  close  to  social
democracy and to the PSOE –Morán, Westendorp– as well as a wider group of young
moderate  reformers,  supporters  of  liberal  democracy  who  were  close  to  Christian
Democracy, such as Oreja, Juan Antonio Ortega, José Luis Navarro and Gabriel Cañadas.
46 However, and quite surprisingly, the socialists, like their center-right predecessors,
made  a  very  restrained  use  of  “political”  (non-career)  ambassadors,  a  relatively
atypical figure in the Spanish diplomatic tradition.
21 A crucial tool for personnel renewal was lowering the mandatory retirement age for
diplomats,  which  dropped  in  1984  from  70  to  65.  This  measure  was  part  of  an
administrative  reform  affecting  all  public  servants,  and  to  some  observers  it  was
critical to “democratize vital sectors of the Administration inherited from Francoism.47
The eldest cohorts, who had entered the diplomatic service in the 1940s, disappeared
overnight,  while younger officials  were promoted very rapidly.48 In just  one decade
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(1980-1990), the average age in most ranks fell by between two and eight years, as was
the  case  of  minister-counselor  (ministro  consejero)  from  48.7  to  40.9  years,  or  first
secretary (secretario de primera) from 39 to 33.3 years.49
22 There  were  also  changes  in  the  recruitment  of  new  diplomats.  The  democratic
governments tried to open up the Foreign Service to Spanish society, as they wanted a
less elitist diplomatic corps. Although we lack sociological studies of Spanish diplomats
in these years, scholars agree that the new generations were less endogamic and more
socially diverse.50 From 1968 to 1988 new students at the School of Diplomacy (Escuela
Diplomática)  belonged  to  increasingly  varied  strata  of  the  middle  classes,  with  a
downward  trend  in  terms  of  social  class;  especially  the  upper  classes  and  the
aristocracy,  once  so  well  represented  in  the  diplomatic  corps,  experienced  a  very
marked setback.51
23 The School of Diplomacy, responsible for training new diplomats, also modernized its
courses  and  its  academic  staff.  The  access  system  created  in  1968  was  partially
amended  in  1977,  when  a  transitional  regime  was  established,  and  in  1982,  the
diplomatic profession was opened to the broader Spanish society. Since 1968 future
diplomats  had  to  hold  a  PhD  or  another  graduate  degree,  obtain  the  diploma  of
international  studies  issued  by  the  School  of  Diplomacy,  take  a  competitive
examination with demanding requirements in language and law and, once admitted,
complete  a  two-year  course  at  the  same  School  of  Diplomacy.  The  system favored
candidates from middle- and upper-class families with sufficient resources to support
themselves during this long formative stage. The reform of 1977 opened entrance to a
wider range of graduates –candidates from technical schools were now admitted– and
reduced  the  course  at  the  School  of  Diplomacy  to  one  year.  The  1982  reform also
eliminated the prerequisite of the Diploma of International Studies, to the benefit of
candidates from lower social classes.52
24 As for the ideological and political adaptation to the new times, an internal report in
1979 by the Commission to Reform the School of Diplomacy called for changes in the
curriculum and recruitment of professors in order to “reflect the current historical and
constitutional situation of the country”.53 According to the diplomat Máximo Cajal, in
1980-1981  the  undersecretary  of  the  MFA  ensured  that  several  senior  diplomats
underwent a process of  “democratic  reeducation” as part  of  a  so-called “recycling”
policy. It consisted in taking “veteran diplomats, many of them heads of mission, who
returned  to  the  ministry  headquarters  in  Madrid  after  two  or  three  foreign
appointments”, and making them familiar with “a Spanish society that was very
different from the one they had left long ago” in the years of the dictatorship.54
25 At the same time, “occupational legacy” dropped: the ratio of incoming diplomats who
were sons or daughters of diplomats went from 1:4 to 1:6 between 1975 and 1990.55 The
admission of  women into  the  diplomatic  service  contributed to  this  renewal.  Here,
change preceded democracy,  since it  was in 1964 when a reform of  the labour law
allowed women to enter diplomacy.56 Slowly overcoming many prejudices from their
male counterparts,  women broke through: in 1971 a woman entered the diplomatic
service for the first time since the Second Republic (1931-1939); by 1975 there were six
female  diplomats  out  of  570  in  total,  and in  1985  the  first  female  ambassador  was
appointed.57
26 Labour relations within the Foreign Service in its broadest sense were also aligned with
the  new  democratic  framework.  Members  of  the  Foreign  Service  were  allowed  to
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organize into unions in 1977, and in 1983 the first strike in the history of diplomacy in
Spain took place –another sign of democratic normalcy.58 Some irregular situations in
the working conditions of many Spanish missions abroad, inherited from the 1960s,
were also amended to align with workers’ rights achieved under democracy.59
 
The impact of “Europe” on the Foreign Service
27 Many of the adaptations discussed so far can be considered as the result of a general
process of modernization and democratization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But in
a more concrete sense,  the prospect  of  membership in the EEC moved the Spanish
government to make reforms throughout the administration and particularly in the
Foreign Service before 1985 in order to adapt to “Europe”. The impact of these reforms
was threefold: they prompted changes in the ministerial structure of the government,
in the staff of the Foreign Service, and in the working culture of some circles within the
Spanish diplomatic service.
28 In February 1978, given the complexity of the negotiations with Brussels affecting all
areas of the State, Prime Minister Suárez entrusted this function to a specific Ministry
for Relations with the European Communities (MREC).60 This ministry carried out its
task from 1978 to 1981 amid frequent bureaucratic infighting with the MFA, whose top
diplomats were unhappy about losing control of negotiations with Brussels.61 The MFA
tried  to  retain  some  power  to  influence  the  negotiation  process  through  the
Coordinating Council for Relations with the European Communities (Consejo Coordinador
de  las  Relaciones  con  las  Comunidades  Europeas)  chaired by the foreign minister  (even
though the effectiveness of this forum was null) and through the Directorate General of
International  Economic  Relations  (Dirección  General  de  Relaciones  Económicas
Internacionales)  of  the  MFA,  which  channeled  information  between  Madrid  and  the
embassies.62 With the change of government in February 1981 the MREC was abolished
and the MFA regained full control of negotiations with the EEC. These were entrusted
to  a  secretary  of  state  for  relations  with  the  European  Communities  under  the
supervision of the foreign minister.
29 The  rivalry  for  control  of  the  negotiations  was  closely  related  to  issues  of  inner
coordination within the Spanish government and with the kind of negotiating strategy
chosen by Madrid. But it was also a matter of which department had the best experts in
European politics,  an  intra-governmental  competition in  which the  MFA had many
advantages. Since the early years of democracy, the Santa Cruz Palace was aware of the
need for staff who knew the EEC well. In 1976, it promoted the idea of a specialized
training center on European issues. As of late 1979, the ministry trained specialized
personnel for the negotiations with Brussels.63
30 The  MFA  actually  had  a  small  but  very  influential  group  of  experts  in  European
institutions whose members had been a driving force of the Europeanization of Spanish
diplomacy and administration since the times of the Franco dictatorship. They were a
handful  of  young diplomats  and senior  officials  linked since  the  1960s  to  José  Luis
Cerón  and  Alberto  Ullastres,  the  two  key  officials  in  the  negotiations  for  the
preferential trade agreement signed by Spain and the EEC in 1970.64 They were the first
specialists  in  European  affairs  anywhere  in  the  Spanish  administration  and  were
considered the predecessors of the so-called Magníficos (“the Magnificent”), the officials
who from 1981  to  1985  negotiated  Spain’s  entry  into  the EEC from three  strategic
Democratization and Europeanization of the Spanish Foreign Service on the Way...
Cahiers de la Méditerranée, 90 | 2015
8
positions:  the  MFA,  the  Spanish  diplomatic  mission  in  Brussels  and  the  Spanish
negotiating delegation.65 These officials were initially centred in the MFA, but as of 1970
they were also working in other ministries such as the Ministry of Commerce (Ministerio
de  Comercio),  in  order  to  implement  the  trade  agreement.  In  the  years  when Spain
negotiated its entry into the Common Market, their everyday collaboration with the
European Commission was a kind of “school of European affairs” for all branches of the
Spanish administration.66
31 It would be impossible to overstate the effects of this experience, together with the
increasing  socialization  of  international  diplomats  and  high-level  senior  Spanish
officials  as  of  1975.  In the final  years of  the Franco regime,  according to a  Belgian
diplomat in Madrid, Spanish diplomats were still living “in an old-fashioned world of
bilateral  diplomacy”  that  contrasted  with  the  everyday  multilateralism  practiced
within  the  framework  of  European  Political  Cooperation  (EPC),  the  foreign  policy
coordination mechanism of the Ten.67 It is not far-fetched to assume that the working
culture  of  many  of  those  Spanish  diplomats  and  civil  servants  in  international
organizations converged with those of their European counterparts through formal and
informal processes of acculturation and transfer.68 Even if the enhanced socialization of
the elite  Spanish civil  servants in European institutions really began in 1986,  there
were two pioneering areas where first steps were taken some years before: NATO and
EPC.
32 In the years that followed Spain’s accession to the Treaty of Washington in 1982, the
Spanish military underwent a deep process of reform, modernization and collaboration
with the armies of the other members of the Alliance. This contributed significantly to
the  consolidation  of  democratic  values  within  its  ranks  and  helped  reinforce  the
supremacy of  the civilian authority of  the Ministry of  Defense on military matters,
following the model of European democratic countries.69 As regards the EPC, Spain and
Portugal joined in 1982 as associate members. From 1982 to 1986 EEC statements on
international issues were thus signed with the formula, “The Ten along with Spain and
Portugal”. Through daily cooperation with the EPC, Spanish foreign policy gradually
converged with that of EEC members, which resulted in Madrid increasingly adopting
common positions  with  the  Ten in  sensitive  areas  such as  East-West  relations,  the
Palestinian issue,  the search for peace in Central  America,  or  sanctions against  the
South African apartheid regime.70 Spanish foreign policy was more “European” every
day, and it slowly walked away from any temptations of isolationism and “third-way”
solutions inherited from the Franco dictatorship.71
 
The challenge of membership
33 It  was  under  the  socialist  governments  headed  by  Prime  Minister  Felipe  González
(1982-1996) that more consistent reforms of the Foreign Service were implemented.
These were a direct result of the accession of Spain to the EEC, since they sought to
prepare the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the new condition of member state that
Spain would take up on 1 January 1986. Foreign Minister Morán (1982-1985) wanted to
reform the ministry at the beginning of his term, but González advised him to wait
until Spain had entered into the European Communities, because this would require
additional adjustments affecting the whole government. Thus it was Morán’s successor,
Francisco Fernández Ordóñez (1985-1992), who promoted the most significant changes. 
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34 In August 1985, only two months after Spain signed the accession treaty to the EEC, the
MFA adopted three significant innovations. The first was the creation of a Secretariat of
State for the European Communities (Secretaría de Estado para las Comunidades Europeas),
which coordinated Spain’s administration in EU institutions, ensured contact with the
Spanish  representation  to  the  EEC  and  was  also  responsible  for  Spain’s  bilateral
relations with the member countries. The second was the creation of a Secretariat of
State  for  International  Cooperation  and  Latin  America  (Secretaría  de  Estado  de
Cooperación  Internacional  e  Iberoamérica),  responsible  for  managing  policy  that  was
hitherto scattered across different ministries.72 The third novelty was the creation of a
Secretariat General of Foreign Policy (Secretaría General de Política Exterior) with the rank
of an undersecretariat and the mission of helping the foreign minister plan, propose
and  carry  out  foreign  policy.  This  secretariat  general  was  also  responsible  for
coordinating the activities of all the directorates general (Direcciones Generales) and for
participating in regular meetings at the level of political directors in the framework of
the  EPC.  Within  this  office  an  under  directorate  for  the  EPC was  created  with  the
mission of taking part in the meetings of the European Political Committees and of
analyzing  and  channeling  the  flow  of  political  information  among  the  foreign
ministries  of  Spain  and  of  the  other  members  of  the  EEC.73 The  importance  that
European issues had acquired for Spain and the close cooperation between the capitals
of the Twelve were firmly anchored in the organizational chart of the MFA.
35 The effort to adjust to the EEC was not limited to the MFA; it also extended to the whole
government, the administration and Spanish society. Implementation of the Treaty of
Accession of Spain to the EEC meant,  according to the former Minister of Economy
Pedro  Solbes,  “a  revolution,  perhaps  the  greatest  revolution  in  our  history”.74 The
government and the administration –at the State, regional and local levels– made a
huge effort to adapt to Community legislation, with special emphasis on foreign affairs,
finance, commerce, agriculture, industry and labour.75 The Cortes played a major role
in the process  by means of  a  Joint  Congress-Senate Committee on European Union
Affairs (Comisión Mixta Congreso Senado para Asuntos de la Unión Europea) that monitored
compliance of national rules with EU directives. This committee came to play three key
roles: it was a central scene for parliamentary debates on Europe, it was the main organ
for parliamentary control of the government, and it became a forum where politicians
effectuated pedagogical work regarding European issues aimed at the mass media and
Spanish society.76
36 The impact of  entry into the EEC on the Spanish administrative structure was also
evident through the appointment of Spanish personnel to European institutions. On
1 January 1986,  Madrid sent  to  Brussels  the two Spanish members of  the European
Commission (Manuel Marín on behalf of the PSOE and Abel Matutes on behalf of the
conservative  party  Alianza  Popular)  along  with  over  a  thousand  diplomats,  senior
officials  and  academics.77 This  meant  an  authentic  brain  drain  and  it  implied  the
dismantling of much of the organizational chart of the Secretariat of State for the EEC
after the departure of a large majority of its members to Brussels.78 Other departments
were  emptied  of  many  of  their  specialists  in  European  issues.  This  challenge  was
intensified  shortly  after  by  the  Single  European  Act  in  1987,  which  led  to  further
adjustments not only in the MFA but throughout the Spanish administration.79
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Conclusions 
37 The prospect of joining the European Community spurred post-Franco Spain to build a
democratic  system.  For  the  generation  that  started  the  transition  to  democracy,
“Europeanization equaled modernization in the social and political orders”,80 and the
terms  Europeanization,  democratization  and  modernization  came  to  be  used
interchangeably  in  political  culture  and  political  practice  as  well as  in  the
administrative  reform  of  those  years.  “Europeanization  –as  the  political  scientist
Ignacio Torreblanca said– must be understood as part of a more general process of
Westernization, standardization or homologation of Spanish foreign policy”.81
38 The recovery of freedom in Spain demanded a new democratic model of foreign policy
that would replace the Francoist model and would fit in better with the new domestic
political  situation.  As  part  of  the  building  of  this  new  foreign  policy,  democratic
governments introduced partial adjustments and changes in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. Some of the changes were derived from the needs and expectations created by
the negotiations for membership of the EEC, but most were simply an expression of
wider  modernization  of  Spanish  diplomacy  and  adaptation  to  democratic  process.
Significantly, a more comprehensive reform of the Foreign Service had to wait until the
entry of Spain into the EEC.
39 In  order  to  assess  the  impact  of  the  negotiations  on  the  Spanish  Foreign  Service
between 1977 and 1986 we must adopt a  double perspective.  On the one hand,  the
direct impact was limited to the handful of diplomats and officials who led the talks
with Brussels. On the other hand, “Europe” as a whole exerted a much broader and
deeper impact in inspiring the democratization of standards, personnel and procedures
within the Spanish Foreign Service. Only a democratic Spain could belong to “Europe”,
and only a renewed Foreign Service could bring the country to this collective goal.
40 Any final assessment of the changes must be qualified in any case, particularly with
regard  to  diplomatic  staff,  a  group  which  as  a  whole  retained  many  features  of  a
traditional,  reserved  and  conservative  body.  Although  minority  groups  favored
democracy from before 1975, diplomatic practices could be democratized only after the
death of Franco,  when institutional structures of  foreign policy adapted to political
change.  The  reforms  initiated  as  of  1976  by  Oreja  gave  an  initial  impetus  in  this
direction, but despite the structural adjustment and the arrival of a new generation of
diplomats,  there  was  a  marked  continuity  between  the  Franco  period  and  the
democratic transition in personnel, practices and habits. The socialist ministers Morán
from 1982 and Fernández Ordóñez from 1985 continued the reformist spirit in the MFA,
as was reflected in a vast white book issued in 1986.82 The most profound changes,
however, would occur through Spain’s participation in the EU from 1986 onwards.83
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